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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
1r

K\ I EKEN1 S" YR INGH A 'Is 1,

Casel >l ( » 20030316 C X

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AN D NA I UR E O F PROCEEDED G
This is an appeal from convictions in two consolidated cases of two counts of
distribution of or arranging to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine with .* p- "^
conviction, both first degree felonies,

11 ,

> r

i i , . t r

v v.c Anii

;oii1ai!ic(l in Stlriemliim ", ),

This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(2002), pursuant to an order dated June 1 ^ ^'0? transferring this matter to this Court
hoiii Lhc Utah Supreme (" mrl

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. Whether, under the "single criminal episode" doctrine, defendant may be
prosecuted for his sale of drugs to a confidential informant after being convicted of
possession of the drugs where the sales and the possessory acts occurred on the same day?
Because defendant fails to comply with this Court's briefing requirements, review
is not warranted, and no standard of review applies.
B. In a related claim, is prosecution for distribution of cocaine barred under the
"single criminal episode" doctrine where defendant had already been convicted of
distribution of methamphetamine, and both sales occurred at different times on the same
day?
This issue of statutory construction is normally reviewed for correctness. State v.
Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, U 4, 976 P.2d 99. However, if this Court reviews the issue, it
should do so under the plain error doctrine because defendant failed to preserve the issue
below. To obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must
establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996)
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208), cert denied 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403 (2003), are
reproduced in Addendum B.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE1
In November, 2001, defendant was charged with multiple offenses committed on
November 7, 2001, which related to his possession of both methamphetamine and
cocaine, as well as his conduct in passing a small tin containing bindles of each substance
to another (R. 059: 49-54, 58-59; R. 063: 47-52, 56-57). He entered guilty pleas and was
sentenced in May, 2002 (R. 059: 50, 58-59, 82-84; R. 063: 48, 56-57).
On April 19, 2002, defendant was charged in the instant cases in separate
informations with distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance—methamphetamine in one case, and cocaine in the other (R. 059: 4-8; R. 063:
1-2). The charges arose from his sale of both substances to a confidential informant in
two different transactions on November 7, 2001—the same day on which he committed
the offenses above to which he pled guilty (R. 059: 11-12; R. 063: 1-2). The charges in
each of these instant consolidated cases were subject to enhancement to first degree
felonies because of the prior conviction (id). Following a joint preliminary hearing in

!

The record on appeal consists of one envelope and two pleading files: defendant
did not request preparation of any transcripts. The pleading file in case number
021800059, involving methamphetamine, will be cited herein as (R. 059:page number).
Case number 021800063, involving cocaine, will be cited as (R. 063:page number). The
case in which defendant entered a guilty plea, case number 011800120, will be referred to
as case "120."
Also, the pleading file in case number 021800059 contains a section where the
page numbers have been mistakenly duplicated. The volume is paginated 1 through 137.
The pages immediately thereafter begin again at 129 and continue sequentially through
the end of the volume. Consequently, the volume has two sets of page numbers 129
through 137.
3

these consolidated cases, defendant was bound over to district court in both cases (R. 059:
44-45; R. 063:41-42).
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges in both cases, arguing that the
offenses charged in these two cases and those charged in November 2001 arose from a
single criminal episode, that he should have been tried on all charges together, and that he
could not be subjected to the trials in the instant cases because of his prior convictions
(id). The district court judge denied the motion, finding that defendant's actions "were
not part of a single criminal objective" (R. 059: 89; R. 063: 78). The judge found
[T]he previous case involved defendant's criminal objective to possess the
drugs and to conceal those drugs when approached by his parole officer,
and by handing them to his cohort. Defendant was not involved in a sale of
the drugs when arrested. His possession at that point was not incident to the
accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge in the case sub
judice, i.e., selling drugs for money.. ..
While it is true that defendant is charged in both cases under [§] 5837-8, a case can be easily envisioned where a defendant is involved in two
drug transactions, would be charged under the same statute, but would not
constitute a single criminal episode. Rather, to be part of a single criminal
episode, the statute requires the actions to be closely related in time and the
defendant must possess a common criminal objective in both offenses. In
the present case, the second prong is not satisfied as there was no single
criminal objective, and where the prior offense was a completed and
separate offense from the subsequent offense for which defendant was
arrested and convicted. As the case is determined under the second prong,
it is unnecessary to address the first prong or temporal requirement of the
statute.
(R. 059: 89; R. 063: 78) (attached in Addendum C).

4

The trial on the methamphetamine charge in case 059 occurred on November 19,
while the trial on the cocaine charge in case 063 occurred on November 21 (R. 59:133-36;
R. 063:128-31). Both juries convicted defendant as charged (R. 059: 129; R. 063: 126).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of five-years-to-life
for each of the two charges, with the sentences to run concurrent to each other but
consecutive to the sentence defendant was already serving (R. 059: 160-62; R. 063: 13640). Defendant timely appealed (R. 059: 169; R. 063: 143,145).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant sold methamphetamine and cocaine to Susie Springer on two separate
occasions on November 7, 2002 (R. 059: 2-8, 49-50; R. 063: 1-7, 47-48). At the time,
Susie was a confidential informant for the Uintah Basin Narcotics Strike Force ["Strike
Force"] (R. 059; 49, 59; R. 063: 47, 57).
The Strike Force used Susie to make numerous controlled substance buys from a
number of people through December 2001 (R. 059: 59-60; R. 063: 57-58). On November
7, Susie made arrangements with the Strike Force to purchase drugs from Ms. Carol
Catoor in Neola, Utah (R. 059: 6, 49; R. 063: 4-5, 47).2 Defendant was at Catoor's home
when Susie arrived, and he sold Susie methamphetamine (R. 059: 6, 50; R. 063: 47).
When Susie met with the Strike Force agents following her purchase, she told them that

2

Carol is referred to as Carol "Catoor" and Carol "Keser" at various places in the
record. The State uses only "Catoor" for consistency but intends to encompass all
versions of the individual's name as may appear in the record.
5

defendant had more drugs to sell (R. 059: 6-7, 50). They had her conduct a second
controlled buy from defendant later that same day, at which time she purchased cocaine,
again at Ms. Catoor's home (R. 063: 4-6, 48).
Later that same day, defendant's parole officer looked for and found defendant in
his truck (R. 059: 68; R. 063: 66-67). When defendant saw him, defendant handed a
small "Altoids" tin to his companion, while he maintained possession of a "Honey Drops"
container (R. 059: 58-61, 68-69; R. 063: 56-59, 66-67). Each container held
methamphetamine and cocaine (id.). Defendant pleaded guilty to four related charges in
that case (R. 059: 56-57, 82-84).
The incident involving defendant's parole officer was charged first and is
referenced herein as case 120 (R. 059: 50-51, 56-57, 68-69; R. 063: 48-49, 66-67, 56-57).
Defendant entered four guilty pleas in that case (R. 059: 56-57; R. 063: 58-59). The
incidents involving sale of drugs to the confidential informant were charged several
months later (R. 059: 50-51, 56-57, 68-69; R. 063: 48-49, 66-67, 56-57). The
methamphetamine charge in case 059 was tried before the cocaine charge in case 063,
with both trials ending in guilty verdicts (R. 059: 129, 133-36; R. 063: 126, 128-31).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Because defendant has not adequately briefed his claim, this Court should refuse to
consider whether the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss these
consolidated cases for an alleged violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 through 403

6

(2003). Defendant's argument presents bare, conclusory statements without factual or
legal support or development of any meaningful analysis. Because compliance with the
briefing rule is mandatory, defendant's argument does not warrant appellate review.
This Court should also refuse to reach the merits of defendant's second argument
because it was not preserved for appeal. Defendant claims that his pre-trial motion to
dismiss filed in both cases below encompassed an alternative argument; that the trial
court dismiss case 021800063 ["063"] following defendant's conviction in case
021800059 ["059"] because the charges arose from the same criminal episode, preventing
him from being subjected to any further prosecutions upon entry of a conviction in case
059, which was scheduled to go to trial first.3 However, a comparison of the motions and
supporting documents filed in these consolidated cases establishes that the documents are
identical and that neither document brings such an argument to the trial court's attention.
As the claim was not preserved below, it should not be reviewed on appeal.
Finally, defendant advances his second claim of error, in the alternative, under the
plain error doctrine. However, he fails to establish the existence of any error, plain or
otherwise, in the trial court's failure to sua sponte dismiss case 063 following defendant's
conviction in case 059. The charges involved separate sales of two different substances

3

Defendant argues the cases in reverse, seeking dismissal of the methamphetamine
charge in case 059 based on a previous conviction of the cocaine charge in case 063. Br.
of Aplt. at 3, 5, 7-11. However, the cases were charged and tried in the order in which
the sales occurred: first the methamphetamine sale, then the cocaine sale. Accordingly,
the State responds to the argument with the cases in their proper order.

7

by defendant at two different times. Under this Court's precedent, defendant's sale of
cocaine in case 063 necessarily had a different criminal objective than his sale of
methamphetamine in case 059. In each case, the buyer wanted, and defendant intended to
sell, a different illegal substance, which substance required different proof at trial.
Hence, defendant's conviction of selling methamphetamine would not preclude his later
prosecution for selling cocaine.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S SALE OF BOTH METHAMPHETAMINE AND
COCAINE TO THE SAME CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AT
TWO DIFFERENT TIMES ON THE SAME DAY DOES NOT ARISE
OUT OF A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE AND, HENCE, DOES
NOT REQUIRE THAT THE CHARGES BE TRIED IN A SINGLE
TRIAL
Defendant purports to present multiple arguments on appeal. First, he claims that
the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss both consolidated cases at issue herein based
on his prior conviction in case 011800120 ["120"]. Br. of Aplt at 7. Second, he claims
that the motion to dismiss filed below included a request that the trial court dismiss case
063 because prosecution of that case would be barred by the "single criminal offense"
doctrine upon a conviction in case 059. Id. at 7-8. He argues that the trial court's failure
to rule on this part of the motion constitutes error. Id. However, this Court need not
reach the merits of these claims because: 1) defendant fails to adequately brief either
argument; and 2) defendant failed to preserve the second argument for appellate review.

8

Finally, defendant alternatively argues that, even if he did not preserve his second
claim below, the trial court's failure to dismiss case 063 once the jury had convicted
defendant of the charge in case 059 amounted to plain error and warrants reversal. Id. at
6-11. Specifically, he argues that his sale of illegal drugs to the same confidential
informant at the same residence at two different times on the same day clearly constituted
a single criminal episode which required that the two sales be charged in one case. Id.
He reasons that his conviction in case 059, therefore, barred any further prosecution of
case 063 under the "single criminal episode" doctrine, and failure to dismiss case 063
amounted to obvious error. Id. Defendant's claim fails because the two sales involved
different drugs and, hence, different criminal objectives which justified the separate
prosecutions.
A.

Defendant's Failure to Adequately Brief His Challenge to the Trial Court's
Denial of His Motion to Dismiss Warrants Rejection of the Claim
Defendant claims that the facts show that all of the conduct relating to the two

drug sales and his later arrest the same day arose from the same criminal episode. Br. of
Aplt. at 6-7. He lists five alleged similarities between the charges in the instant
consolidated cases, then baldly states:
. . . the trial court should have granted [defendant's] Motion to Dismiss and
dismissed cases 021800059 and 021800063 on the basis that [defendant]
was convicted and sentenced in case 011800120 and therefore based on the
provisions of Utah law[5] the doctrine of single criminal episode applied
and any further convictions were barred by double jeopardy.

9

Id. at 7. Defendant presents no further argument in support of this issue, instead
immediately moving to his next claim of error. Id. at 7-10. Neither does he request any
relief for the claimed violation in his "Conclusion." Id. at 11. Instead, at one point, he
concedes that "it is possible the trial court was correct" in its ruling that case 120 and the
consolidated cases herein did not involve a single criminal episode. Id. at 10.
Defendant's assertions are merely conclusory statements without factual or legal
support, undeserving of appellate review. Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, outlining appellate briefing standards, requires that, in an appellate brief, the
"argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented ... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied
on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This implicitly requires not only citation to authority, but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority. See State v.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 26-27, 989 P.2d 503. Compliance with the briefing rules
of this Court is mandatory, and appellate courts have repeatedly declined to consider
inadequately briefed arguments on appeal. See id.; see also Beehive Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Comm 'n of Utah, 2004 UT

, Iffl 12-14,

Utah Adv. Rep.

; State

v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1 If 10, 973 P.2d
404; Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996). It should do so now, in
the face of defendant's failure to cite relevant legal authority or provide any meaningful
analysis regarding his claim of error. See Utah R. App. P. 24 (a) (9).
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B.

Defendant did not Preserve his Claim that the Trial Court Erroneously
Failed to Grant His Request that Case 063 Alone be Dismissed under
the "Single Criminal Episode" Doctrine where no such Request was
Made Below
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charge in

case 063 upon defendant's conviction in case 059 because both cases arose from a single
criminal episode. Br. of Aplt. at 3, 5-6, 8. This Court should refuse to reach the merits of
defendant's second argument because it was not preserved below.
To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the
trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn
Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998), reh yg denied (Sep. 9, 1998); State v. Hardy,
2002 UT App 244, % 15, 54 P.3d 645. It is well-established that a defendant who fails to
bring an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App.1991).
An issue is sufficiently raised to permit appellate review where the following three
requirements are met: (1) it must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) it must be raised
specifically; and (3) it must be accompanied by supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority. See State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 45 f 6, 975 P.2d 476 (quotations omitted);
Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, lj 15.
Defendant argues that his motion to dismiss below included a claim that the charge
in case 063 should be dismissed because it arose from the same criminal episode as the
11

charge in case 059, preventing separate prosecutions for the two charges. Br. of Aplt. at
3, 5-6, 8. Anticipating a preservation argument from the State, defendant asserts that
the original Motion to Dismiss listed first the request to dismiss both
subsequent cases [059 and 063] and in the alternative a request to dismiss
only 059 based on the filing of 063.
Id. at 8 (bracketed information added). Defendant then goes on to argue plain error,
without further explaining the preservation of his claim or arguing its merits. Id.
A review of the motion and the supporting memorandum filed in these cases does
not support defendant's claim. The motions and memoranda filed by defendant were
identical (all are attached in Addendum D). The motion itself states:
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and
403. The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for the
present offense since the state previously prosecuted the Defendant for
offenses occurring on the same date which were part of a single criminal
episode which resulted in a conviction of the Defendant.
(R. 059: 56; R. 063: 54). Add. D. This language does not preserve defendant's appellate
argument for two reasons. First, use of the identical language in both motions does not
alert the court that defendant intended to present two arguments in case 063 rather than
the single argument he set forth in case 059. Second, at the time defendant filed his
motions, the State had not yet "previously prosecuted" him to a conviction in case 059.
The supporting memoranda are also identical. Add. D. They speak in terms of
charges "following his arrest on November 7" and the "remaining charges" later brought
against him; charges brought in November 2001, and charges brought in April 2002;

12

"charges presently being brought" and "previous charges which have been adjudicated;"
and the prosecutor's knowledge of all the charges at the time "the initial information" was
filed (R. 059: 52-53; R. 063: 50-51). Add. D. His recitation of authority consists of a
brief description of two cases, and the statement that all the charges brought against him
were charged under the same code section (R. 059: 53-54; R. 063: 56-57). Add. D.
The only distinction made in the supporting memoranda is the one between the
charges in case 020 and those in the consolidated cases herein. The only charges which
had already been adjudicated at the time defendant filed his motions were those involved
in case 020. Nothing in the identical memoranda suggested to the trial court that it should
consider dismissing anything less than both the charges involved herein.
Because the memoranda were not sufficiently specific to alert the trial court that a
separate ruling involving the dismissal of only case 063 was requested, defendant did not
sufficiently raise the issue below to preserve that issue for appellate review. See Hardy,
2002UTApp244,1|l5.
C.

The Sale of Methamphetamine and the Sale of Cocaine in this Case do not
Obviously Share a Single Criminal Objective and. Hence, do not Plainly Arise
out of a Single Criminal Episode
Of the three exceptions to the general rule of issue preservation recognized in

Utah, defendant addresses only one—plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993); Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922. He argues that regardless of what
this Court finds he included in his motion to dismiss below, the trial court was on notice

13

that all the charges against him arose from the same facts and incidents and that defendant
was concerned about being "unfairly bombarded with multiple criminal convictions"
arising from a single criminal episode. Br. of Aplt. at 8-9.
To obtain appellate relief through the doctrine of "plain error," an appellant must
establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful." See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996)
(quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208), cert, denied 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). If appellant
fails to prove one of these requirements, plain error is not established. Id. at 1209.
In this case, defendant's argument is based on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(1)
(1999), which provides:
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or
should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the
former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(ii) resulted in conviction[.]
Add. B. Under section 76-1-402(2) (2003), if multiple charges arise out of a single
criminal episode, a defendant cannot be subject to separate trials unless the court orders
otherwise. Add. B. Thus, in order for the State to be barred from prosecuting defendant
in case 063 for the felony charge of distribution of cocaine, this Court must find that the
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charge was part of the same "criminal episode" as the charge of distribution of
methamphetamine.
The term "single criminal episode" is defined for purposes of this rule as "all
conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401; see also
State v. Keppler, 1999 UT App 89, \ 5, 976 P.2d 99. Accordingly, resolution of the
remaining issue in this case depends upon a finding, under the plain error doctrine, as to
whether defendant's sale of cocaine to a confidential informant is, under the specific facts
of this case, "incident" to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as
defendant's sale of methamphetamine to the same informant earlier on the same day.
Another panel of this Court addressed this issue in State v. Spaulding, 1999 UT
App 324, T{ 3 (unpublished memorandum decision attached in Addendum E).4 In
Spaulding, defendant pled guilty to possession of marijuana and to two other offenses.
Id at 111. Add. E. Thereafter, he was prosecuted separately for possession of
methamphetamine. Id. Add. E. On appeal, he argued, in part, that his prosecution for
possession of methamphetamine after having been convicted of possession of marijuana

4

The State cites to Spaulding pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,
If 16, 44 P.3d 734 ("[Djecisions of the court of appeals expressed in a memorandum
decision, or in an opinion, are equally binding upon lower courts of this state, and may be
cited to the degree that they are useful, authoritatively and persuasively.").
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subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1), because
the offenses were closely "related in time." Id. Add. E.
This Court rejected defendant's claim with the following analysis:
Similarly, Spaulding's possession of marijuana and possession of
methamphetamine cannot be considered part of the same "criminal
objective." Though the offenses are charged under the same general statute,
they involve different subsections because they concern different drugs.
Proof of Spaulding's possession of marijuana would not sustain a
conviction for possession of methamphetamine and vice versa.
Furthermore, in Keppler, 976 P.2d at 100, this court cited approvingly to
cases from other jurisdictions concluding the statutory prohibition against
multiple punishments for the same conduct does not preclude separate
conviction for simultaneous possession of certain drugs. See People v.
Mfojnarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 247, 250 (Cal. App. 1998) (determining
defendant was properly charged separately under the same code section for
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567
A.2d 126 (Md. Ct. 1989) (concluding defendant was correctly charged
separately under same code section for simultaneously possessing heroin
and cocaine); State v. Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (determining
defendant was properly charged separately under same code section for
simultaneously possessing cocaine and marijuana). Accordingly, Spaulding
has not been subjected to double jeopardy.
Spaulding, 1999 UT App 324, \ 3. Add. E.
In this case, defendant was charged under the same statutory subsection with
distribution of two different drugs (R. 059: 9-10; R. 063: 1-2). As with Spaulding, proof
of defendant's distribution of methamphetamine "would not sustain a conviction" for
distribution of cocaine and vice versa. Spaulding, 1999 UT App 324, \ 3. Add. E.
Moreover, as recognized in Spaulding, the court's opinion in State v. Keppler,
1999 UT App 89, 976 P.2d 99, supports this outcome. In that case, the court considered
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whether Keppler's prior guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia precluded a later
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine when the drug paraphernalia and the
methamphetamine were found in Keppler's possession "at the same time and in the same
location." Id. at % 4. The court held that the criminal objective in a possessory offense is
determined by "the specific nature of the property possessed." Id. at ^ 6. Accordingly,
where defendant's criminal objectives were to possess methamphetamine in one case and
to possess drug paraphernalia in the other case, his objectives were different, and the
charges were not part of the same criminal episode under section 76-1-401. Id. at ^} 5, 8.
See also State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995).
In support of its analysis in Keppler, this Court cited approvingly to cases from
other jurisdictions which involved the same basic challenge presented here: whether the
statutory prohibition against multiple punishments for the same conduct would preclude
separate conviction for simultaneous possession of two different drugs. Id. at \ 6. In
most of the cases cited, the separate possessory offenses were charged under the same
code section, and the separate charging of those offenses was held to be proper. See
People v. Monarrez, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. App. 1998) (defendant was properly
charged separately under the same code section for simultaneous possession of heroin
and cocaine); Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md. App. 1989) (same); State v.
Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986) (defendant was properly charged separately under
the same code section for simultaneous possession of cocaine and marijuana). While
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these cases involved possessory offenses, the same reasoning would apply to the instant
distribution charges.
Further, the distinction between different controlled substances has been
recognized by the Utah Legislature. Although possession of controlled substances is
generally prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8, the code treats drug offenses
differently based on the specific type of controlled substance at issue. "The narcotics are
separately classified and regulated by the Legislature; they have different effects and
pose different hazards to society." Monarrez, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d at 250.
In addition, there is no reasonably characterized "singular criminal objective" for
these offenses asserted by defendant. Defendant claims that the common objective of
both of the charged offenses was "to sell drugs to Springer." Br. of Aplt. at 10. Such a
characterization of the purpose of the charged offenses could hardly be stated more
broadly, and is the equivalent of saying that defendant's purpose was "to break the law."
At this level of generality, almost any combination of crimes would fall under the single
criminal episode rule. Instead, as Keppler requires, the criminal objective of defendant's
acts must be characterized in terms of the specific substance at issue: defendant's
objective in one offense was to sell cocaine and in the other was to sell
methamphetamine. Thus, in each case, defendant's purpose was not simply to sell an
illegal substance; it was to sell a particular drug which has particular properties. See
State v. Strader, 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App. 1995) (the objectives of the criminal acts
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are to be construed narrowly for purposes of determining whether they constitute a single
criminal episode under section 76-1-401), cert denied 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); see
also State v. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1977) (the offenses cannot be treated as a
single criminal episode under section 76-1-401 because "although the testimony given
may overlap, the offenses are different and the proof requirements are different").
Moreover, the sales occurred separately, with the informant leaving for several hours
before returning to make the second purchase, emphasizing that the second transaction
was in no way necessary to accomplishment of the criminal objective involved with the
first transaction.
Accordingly, defendant's sale of cocaine to a confidential informant in this case is
not "incident" to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as defendant's sale
of methamphetamine to the same informant on the same day, and defendant's claim of
plain error fails.
Defendant does not recognize the need for this Court to make this finding because
he claims that "the same drug, methamphetamine, was sold on both occasions[.]" Br. of
Aplt. at 7. Specifically, he asserts "that case 059 is identical to case 063[.]" Id. at 10. He
asserts that his two "acts of selling drugs to Susie Springer on November 7, 2001 were
one criminal objective[,]" that there "was one criminal intention-to sell drugs to Springer,
one general impulse-to deal drugs from [one person's] house; one plan-to deal
methamphetamine." Id. He continues, "Even if there was more than one act or a series of
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acts or transactions there was one offense—dealing methamphetamine to Susie Springer."
Id, Moreover, in support of his claims, he asserts, in part, that "the affidavits of probable
cause to support the arrest and Information were identical in both cases 021800059 and
021800063." Id. at 7.
Defendant fails to provide record citation to support his claim that he intended to,
and did, sell only methamphetamine to the informant. Moreover, the record demonstrates
repeatedly that only one of the two sales and subsequent charges involved
methamphetamine, while the other involved cocaine.
The record in case 059 is replete with references to the sale of methamphetamine,
including: the information (R. 059:2-3); the warrant of arrest (R. 059: 4); the affidavit of
probable cause (R. 059: 5-8); the amended information (R. 059: 9-10); the verdict (R.
059: 129); the jury instructions (R. 059: 111, 113, 114, 126); and the judgment,
commitment & order (R. 059: 164-65). The record in case 063 contains similar
references relating, instead, to cocaine (R. 063: 1-7, 26-27, 110, 112, 113, 125, 126, 13842). Defendant's memorandum supporting his motion to dismiss recites the facts as
involving a sale of methamphetamine and a sale of cocaine (R. 059: 50-51; R. 063: 4849).
Even defendant's appellate brief is internally inconsistent with his claim that he
sold only methamphetamine to the informant. In his fact statement, defendant notes that
the informant first purchased methamphetamine from him, then later "made a second
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purchase of drugs." Br. of Aplt. at 4. In the next paragraph, defendant says that he went
into town after he "had engaged in the two sales of cocaine" to the informant. Id.
(emphasis added). Thereafter, in his argument, defendant argues that both sales involved
"one plan—to deal methamphetamine." Id. at 10.
Further, defendant's assertion that his claim is supported, in part, by the "fact" that
the probable cause affidavits in these cases are "identical" is belied by the record. Id. at
7. A review of the affidavits reveals that there is very little in the two documents that is
"identical" (R. 059: 5-8; R. 063: 4-7) (attached in Addendum F). They were sworn to by
different affiants, the affiants held different jobs, they attested to different activities, and,
most importantly, their statements involved different drugs (id.). Add. F. Accordingly,
under the facts as established by the record in this case, defendant was properly charged,
in separate proceedings, with the distribution of methamphetamine and cocaine.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
defendant's convictions in these consolidated cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 9

day of March, 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

fS C. LEONA
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Julie George,
attorney for defendant/appellant, 32 Exchange Place, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this /^-"day of March, 2004.
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(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for a n y p e r s o n to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess w i t h i n t e n t to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or a r r a n g e to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance w i t h i n t e n t to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise w h e r e :
(A) t h e person participates, directs, or engages i n conduct
which results in a n y violation of a n y provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d t h a t is a felony; a n d
(B) t h e violation is a p a r t of a contiiiuing series of two or m o r e
violations of Title 58, C h a p t e r s 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions t h a t a r e u n d e r t a k e n in concert w i t h five or
more persons with respect to whom t h e person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or a n y other position of m a n a g e m e n t .
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) w i t h respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and u p o n a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or m a r i j u a n a , is
guilty of a third degree felony, a n d upon a second or s u b s e q u e n t
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor a n d upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a t h i r d degree felony.
(c) Any person who h a s been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) m a y be sentenced to imprisonment for a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e
term as provided by law, b u t if t h e trier of fact finds a firearm a s defined
in Section 76-10-501 w a s used, carried, or possessed on his p e r s o n or i n h i s
immediate possession during t h e commission or in furtherance of t h e
offense, t h e court shall additionally sentence t h e person convicted for a
term of one year to r u n consecutively and not concurrently; a n d t h e court
m a y additionally sentence t h e person convicted for a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m
not to exceed five years to rim, consecutively a n d not concurrently.

of not less t h a n seven years a n d winch may De lor lite, imposition or
execution of t h e sentence m a y not*be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it w a s obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in t h e course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, t e n a n t , licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(hi) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess a n
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if t h e a m o u n t is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if t h e
amount is more t h a n 16 ounces, but less t h a n 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if t h e m a r i j u a n a is not in the form of a n extracted
resin from any p a r t of t h e plant, and the amount is more t h a n one
ounce but less t h a n 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
t h e exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined i n Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater t h a n provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of a n y
controlled substance by a person, t h a t person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty t h a n provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less t h a n one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction t h e person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a t h i r d degree
felony.
Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in t h e course of t h e manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,

be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, vete
in&rian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or a t t e m p t 1
procure t h e administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescrit
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtai
possession of, or to procure t h e administration of any controlle
substance by misrepresentation or failure by t h e person to disclose bu
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, for^
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or w r i t t e n orde
for a controlled substance, or t h e use of a false n a m e or address;
(iii) to m a k e any false or forged prescription or written order for
controlled substance, or to u t t e r t h e same, or to alter any prescriptio
or written order issued or written u n d e r t h e t e r m s of this chapter; c
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, c
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the t r a d e m a r l
t r a d e n a m e , or other identifying m a r k , imprint, or device of a n o t h e r c
any likeness of any of t h e foregoing upon any drug or container c
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person nc
authorized u n d e r this chapter who commits any act declared to b
unlawful u n d e r this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, U t a h Drug P a r a p h e i
nalia Act, or u n d e r Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled S u b s t a n c e
Act, is upon conviction subject to t h e penalties a n d classifications u n d e
Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on t h
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti
tution or on t h e grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or othe
structure or grounds which are, a t t h e time of t h e act, being u s e d fo
a n activity sponsored by or through a school or institution u n d e
Subsections (4)(a)(i) a n d (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, a m u s e m e n t park, arcade, or recreation center
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, t h e a t e i
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds includec
i n Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger t h a n 18 y e a r s o
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted u n d e r this Subsection (4) is guilty of a firsi
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less t h a n five years
if t h e penalty t h a t would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or executior

of t h e sentence m a y not be suspended, a n d t h e person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If t h e classification t h a t would otherwise have been established
would have been less t h a n a first degree felony b u t for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted u n d e r this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
t h a n t h e m a x i m u m penalty prescribed for t h a t offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution u n d e r this Subsection (4) t h a t t h e
actor mistakenly believed t h e individual to be 18 years of age or older a t
the t i m e of t h e offense or was u n a w a r e of t h e individual's t r u e age; nor
t h a t t h e actor mistakenly believed t h a t t h e location w h e r e t h e act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or w a s u n a w a r e t h a t t h e location
where t h e act occurred w a s as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, a n d
not in lieu of, a n y civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or t h e law of
another state, conviction or acquittal u n d e r federal law or t h e law of
another state for t h e s a m e act is a b a r to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence t h a t
the person or persons did so with knowledge of t h e character of t h e substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in t h e
course of his professional practice only a n d not for h u m a n s , from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing t h e Substances to be administered by an a s s i s t a n t or orderly u n d e r his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability m a y not be imposed u n d e r this section on:
(a) any person registered u n d e r t h e Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses a n imitation controlled substance
for u s e as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in t h e course a n d legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or t h e application of a n y provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, t h e remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without t h e invalid provision or application.

Addendum B

UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — J o i n d e r of
offenses and defendants.

1953

VOLUME 8B
2003 REPLACEMENT

Titles 76 and 77

In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.

76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent pre
cution for offense out of same episode.

(1) A defendant m a y be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when t h e
same act of a defendant u n d e r a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which m a y be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
;ode, the act shall be punishable u n d e r only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence u n d e r any such provision bars a prosecution u n d e r
my other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct m a y establish separate offenses u n d e r a single
criminal episode, unless t h e court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
lefendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within t h e jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to t h e prosecuting attorney a t t h e time the
defendant is arraigned on t h e first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant m a y be convicted of an offense included in t h e offense
harged but m a y not be convicted of both the offense charged and t h e included
ffense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less t h a n all the facts
required to establish t h e commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes a n attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit t h e offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the j u r y with respect to a n
ncluded offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
lefendant of t h e offense charged a n d convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
ourt on appeal or certiorari, shall determine t h a t there is insufficient evidence
o support a conviction for t h e offense charged but t h a t there is sufficient^
vidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact"
Lecessarily found every fact required for conviction of t h a t included offense,
be verdict or j u d g m e n t of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
ldgment of conviction entered for t h e included offense, without necessity of a
ew trial, if such relief is sought by t h e defendant.

(1) If a defendant h a s been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising
of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for t h e s a m e <
different offense arising out of t h e same criminal episode is b a r r e d if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for a n offense t h a t was or should 1
been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in t h e former prosecution; a
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was t e r m i n a t e d by a final order or j u d g m e n t for t h e defenc
t h a t h a s not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and t h a t necesss
required a determination inconsistent with a fact t h a t must
established to secure conviction in t h e subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if t h e prosecution resulted in a finding of n o t gi
by t h e trier of facts or in a determination t h a t t h e r e w a s insufficient evide
to w a r r a n t conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense ig
acquittal of t h e greater offense even though t h e conviction for t h e lei
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if t h e prosecution resulted in a j u d g m e n t of g
t h a t h a s not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty t h a t h a s
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and t h a t is capable of supportin
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by t h e court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if t h e termination ta
place before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to a n acquittal, a n d ta
place after a j u r y h a s been impanelled and sworn to t r y t h e defendant, or, if
j u r y trial is waived, after t h e first witness is sworn. However, terminatioi
prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to t h e termination; or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to t h e termination;
(c) The court finds and states for t h e record t h a t the terminatior
necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed w i t h t h e trial in confornc
with t h e law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to
state t h a t would m a k e any j u d g m e n t entered upon a verdict reve
ible as a m a t t e r of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of t h e courtroom not a t t r i b u t a
to t h e s t a t e m a k e s it impossible to proceed w i t h t h e t r i a l with<
injustice to t h e defendant or t h e state; or
(iv) The j u r y is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(v) False s t a t e m e n t s of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
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FILED
DISraiCT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

NOV 0 1 2002
RV

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
fJ\
DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Criminal No. 021800063
KYLE KENT STRTNGHAM,
Defendant.

Judge John R. Anderson

The Court having received defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition, and defendant's Reply, and the matter having come before the Court for oral
argument on October 28, 2002, having reviewed the pleadings, receiving argument and being
otherwise folly informed, enters the following:
The issue before the Court is whether the acts of the defendant were within a single
criminal episode, which should have been tried in defendant's previous case. Defendant
correctly argues that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403, prohibits the subsequent prosecution of an
offense that should have been tried under section 402(2) and the former prosecution in this case
resulted in a conviction. Section 76-1-402(2) mandates the defendant should not be subject to
separate trials where the conduct occurred as part of a single criminal episode in the jurisdiction
of one court, and the offenses were known to the prosecution at defendant's arraignment for the
first information. A single criminal episode is defined in § 76-1-401 as "all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective." As mentioned earlier, the only issue before the Court is whether defendant's actions
satisfy both prongs of the single criminal episode statute, and would thereby preclude the current
prosecution.
Applying the facts to the second prong of the statutory requirements, under a totality of
circumstances approach, defendant's actions were not part of a single criminal objective. As the
plaintiff argues, the previous case involved defendant's criminal objective to possess the drugs
and to conceal those drugs when approached by his parole officer, and by handing them to his
cohort. Defendant was not involved in a sale of the drugs when arrested. His possession at that
point was not incident to the accomplishment of the same criminal objective as the charge in the
case sub judice, i e., selling drugs for money. Defendant cites to Commonwealth v McPhail
631 A 2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) in support of his argument. In McPhail the defendant had
been involved in three separate and completed drug transactions with undercover agents. Unlike
McPhail our defendant, had allegedly been involved in two previous completed drug
transactions, and then was subsequently arrested when his parole officer conducted an in filed

investigation, based upon information he had gained from the prior sales and through a
confidential informant.
While it is true that defendant is charged in both cases under 58-37-8, a case can be easily
envisioned where a defendant is involved in two drug transactions, would be charged under the
same statute, but would not constitute a single criminal episode. Rather, to be part of a single
criminal episode, the statute requires the actions to be closely related in time and the defendant
must possess a common criminal objective in both offenses. In the present case, the second
prong is not satisfied as there was no single criminal objective, and where the prior offense was a
completed and separate offense from the subsequent offense for which defendant was arrested
and convicted. As the case is determined under the second prong, it is unnecessary to address the
first prong or temporal requirement of the statute
Based upon the above-mentioned, and the reasoning found in the memoranda, and
presented at oral argument, it is hereby ORDERED, defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
Dated this ^ f

day of October, 2002.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 021800059 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

By Hand
Dated this _[

day of

fb'J

NAME
JOEL D BERRETT
ATTORNEY DEF
58 EAST 100 NORTH
P.O. BOX 2 62
ROOSEVELT, UT 84066
HERBERT W. GILLESPIE
, 20 hi

UHk.

.

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

Addendum D

riLfcu
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY. UTAH

SEP 1 B 2002
JOEL D. BERRETT #0307
Attorney for Defendant
V
P.O. Box 2 62
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(435) 722-3606

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
BY- l / k ^ i

DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM,
Defendant.

Case No.
Judge:

021800059

JOHN R. ANDERSON

COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and moves the aboveentitled Court for an Order Dismissing charges presently pending
against the Defendant in the above entitled Court.
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and
403.

The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for

the present offense since the state previously prosecuted the
Defendant for offenses occurring on the same date which were part
of a single criminal episode which resulted in a conviction of the
Defendant.
DATED this

//?

day of September, 2002.
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JQ^L D. BERRETT
:orney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this /&
day of September,
2 002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Continue and Order to Continue to:
Herbert Wm. Gillespie
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
by depositing same in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt,
Utah.
Secretary
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DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

SEP 1 a 2002
JOEL D. BERRETT #0307
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 262
R o o s e v e l t , U t a h 84066
(435) 7 2 2 - 3 6 0 6

JOANNE McKEE, CLERK
BY
TI^LS
HFPI ITV

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

:

KYLE KENT STRINGHAM,

:

Case No.

Defendant.

:

Judge:

021800059

JOHN R. ANDERSON

COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and in support of
the Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court respectfully submits the
following memorandum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On and prior to November 7, 2001 Susie Springer was

engaged as a compensated confidential informant for the Plaintiff.
2.

On November 7, 2001, Ms. Springer contacted agents of the

Plaintiff and indicated that she was aware of an opportunity to buy
illegal drugs from Carol Catoor.
3.

Ms.

Springer

met

with

agents

of

the

Plaintiff

in

Roosevelt where arrangements were made to complete a purchase of
illegal drugs from Ms. Catoor in Neola, Utah.

1

4.

Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then traveled to

the home of Ms. Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly
purchased methamphetamine from the Defendant who was present and in
possession of the drugs at the time of transfer.
5.

Later that day, Ms. Springer again met with the agents of

the Plaintiff in Roosevelt, Utah and made arrangements to make
another purchase of illegal drugs from the Defendant.
6.

Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then went to the

home of Ms. Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly made a
purchase of cocaine from the Defendant.
7.

Following the alleged purchase, Ms. Springer met with

agents of the state and indicated that Defendant still had illegal
drugs for sale.
8.

Immediately thereafter, an agent of the state traveled

toward Defendant's mother's home and found Defendant in his pickup
where he was arrested for possession of cocaine and methamphetamine
with intent to distribute.
9.

The

state

filed

charges

against

the

Defendant

in

November, 2001. The Defendant was sentenced on May 6, 2002 for
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance,
cocaine a second degree felony; distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a second degree
felony; possession or use of a controlled substance with prior
conviction, methamphetamine, a second degree felony; and possession
or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, cocaine,
2

a second degree felony.
10.

Charges against Defendant

for the alleged drug sales

occurring on November 7, 2 001, were not filed until April, 2 002.
11.

Jury trials are scheduled for Defendant on the instant

case for November, 2002.
AGRUMENT
Utah Code § 76-1-403 in relevant part states:
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one
or more offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution
for the same or a different offense arising
out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been
tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2)
in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(ii) resulted in conviction;
Utah Code § 76-1-402 in relevant part states:
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote
justice, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction
of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Utah Code § 76-1-401 in relevant part states:
*single criminal episode" means all conduct
which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.
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As the statutes make clear, if a defendant is involved in more
than one offense arising out of a single criminal episode and he is
prosecuted on some of the offenses, further prosecution for other
offenses are barred if the former prosecution resulted
conviction.

in a

Utah Code § 76-1-403. This is consistent with what

happened in this case.

Allegedly the Defendant was in Duchesne

County to sell illegal drugs. He allegedly made two drug sales and
was arrested for possession with intent to distribute all on the
same day.

The information that he had additional drugs was

obtained from the confidential informant.

All of the offenses

involving the Defendant occurred on the same day, involved the same
officers and occurred in the same county.
According to Utah Code § 76-1-402(2) if conduct establishes
separate offenses under a single criminal episode, the offenses are
within the jurisdiction of a single court and the offenses are
known to the prosecuting attorney then the defendant may not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses.

It is clear that

at the time the initial information was filed that the state, its
officers and attorneys were aware of all of the charges that could
be brought against the Defendant.

In fact, the charges presently

being brought were allegedly committed earlier on the same day as
the previous charges which have been adjudicated.

The state could

not argue that the offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the
court or that the prosecuting attorney did not know of all the
offenses allegedly committed by the Defendant.
4

A conscious choice

was made to bring some of the charges against the Defendant
following his arrest on November 7, 2001 and to later bring the
remaining charges against the Defendant.
All of the charges brought against the Defendant are closely
related in time and are incident to an attempt or an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.

Assuming the state's evidence to

be true, the Defendant was in Duchesne County, Utah in possession
of methamphetamine and cocaine which he intended to sell.

One sale

occurred in the morning of November 7, 2001. Another sale occurred
in the afternoon of November 7, 2 001.

The Defendant was arrested

shortly after the second sale and charges for possession were
brought against him. He plead guilty to four second
involving possession
possession

and

distribution

and distribution

of methamphetamine

of cocaine.

initially brought in November, 2001.

degree felonies
and

Those charges were

In April, 2002, charges were

brought against the Defendant alleging that he had distributed
cocaine and methamphetamine.
The court in State v. Crosby, 927 P 2d 638 (Utah 1996) stated
that if there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one
plan, even thought there is a serious of transactions, there is but
one offense.
In State v. Keppler, 976 P 2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the
court indicated: "The specific nature of the property possessed
determines the offense in a possession offense. In this case, we
note that the property implicated in the two charges is not of the
5

same quality.

The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession

of drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as
separate statutory offenses."
In the Keppler case, the Court allowed the plaintiff to
separately prosecute a charge of possession of paraphernalia from
possession of methamphetamine.
In this case, all charges brought against the Defendant are
charged under Utah Code § 58-37-8.
CONCLUSION
The charges pending against the Defendant at the present time
should be dismissed based on the law referred to above.

DATED this

/LS

day of September, 2002.

JOEy D. BERRETT
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this JV
day of September,
2 002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum to:
Herbert Wm. Gillespie
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
by depositing same in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt,
Utah.
Secretary
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DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

SEPfWEH
NE McljEE,
MchCE CLERK
JOANNE

BY.

JOEL D. BERRETT #0307
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 262
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(435) 722-3606

.DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff,
vs.
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM,
Defendant.

Case No.
Judge:

021800063

JOHN R. ANDERSON

COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and moves the aboveentitled Court for an Order Dismissing charges presently pending
against the Defendant in the above entitled Court.
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code § 76-1-401, 402 and
403.

The statutes bar the state from prosecuting the Defendant for

the present offense since the state previously prosecuted the
Defendant for offenses occurring on the same date which were part
of a single criminal episode which resulted in a conviction of the
Defendant.
DATED this

day of September, 2002.

JQJJL D. BERRETT
:orney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE

OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this
day of September,
2002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion

to Continue

and Order

to Continue

to:

Herbert Wm. Gillespie
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
P.O. Box 206
Duchesne, Utah 84021
by depositing same in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt,
Utah.
Secretary
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uio i HlUT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

SEP 1 8 2002
JNE MdfEE,
McKE CLERK
JOANNE

JOEL D. BERRETT #0307
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 262
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
(435) 722-3606

(UJJ

BY.

.DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - DUCHESNE COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
KYLE KENT STRINGHAM,

Case No.

Defendant.

Judge:

021800063

JOHN R. ANDERSON

COMES NOW the Defendant, by his attorney, and in support of
the Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court respectfully submits the
following memorandum.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On and prior to November 7, 2001 Susie Springer was

engaged as a compensated confidential informant for the Plaintiff.
2.

On November 7, 2001, Ms. Springer contacted agents of the

Plaintiff and indicated that she was aware of an opportunity to buy
illegal drugs from Carol Catoor.
3.

Ms. Springer met with

agents

of

the

Plaintiff

in

Roosevelt where arrangements were made to complete a purchase of
illegal drugs from Ms. Catoor in Neola, Utah.
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4.

Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then traveled to

the home of Ms, Catoor in Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly
purchased methamphetamine from the Defendant who was present and in
possession of the drugs at the time of transfer.
5.

Later that day, Ms. Springer again met with the agents of

the Plaintiff in Roosevelt, Utah and made arrangements to make
another purchase of illegal drugs from the Defendant.
6.

Ms. Springer and agents of the Plaintiff then went to the

home of Ms. Catoor in^ Neola where Ms. Springer allegedly made a
purchase of cocaine from the Defendant.
7.

Following the alleged purchase, Ms. Springer met with

agents of the state and indicated that Defendant still had illegal
drugs for sale.
8.

Immediately thereafter, an agent of the state traveled

toward Defendant's mother's home and found Defendant in his pickup
where he was arrested for possession of cocaine and me thamphet amine
with intent to distribute.
9.

The

state

filed

charges

against

the

Defendant

in

November, 2001. The Defendant was sentenced on May 6, 2002 for
distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance,
cocaine a second degree felony; distribution of or arranging to
distribute a controlled substance, methamphetainine, a second degree
felony; possession or use of a controlled substance with prior
conviction, methamphetamine, a second degree felony; and possession
or use of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, cocaine,
2

a second degree felony.
10.

Charges against Defendant for the alleged drug sales

occurring on November 7, 2001, were not filed until April, 2002.
11.

Jury trials are scheduled for Defendant on the instant

case for November, 2002.
AGRUMENT
Utah Code § 76-1-403 in relevant part states:
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one
or more offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution
for the same or a different offense arising
out of the same criminal episode is barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an
offense that was or should have been
tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2)
in the former prosecution; and
(b) The former prosecution:
(ii) resulted in conviction;
Utah Code § 7 6-1-402 in relevant part states:
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate
offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote
justice, a defendant shall not be subject
to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction
of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
Utah Code § 7 6-1-401 in relevant part states:
''single criminal episode" means all conduct
which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.

3

As the statutes make clear, if a defendant is involved in more
than one offense arising out of a single criminal episode and he is
prosecuted on some of the offenses, further prosecution for other
offenses are barred if the former prosecution resulted in a
conviction.

Utah Code § 76-1-403. This is consistent with what

happened in this case.

Allegedly the Defendant was in Duchesne

County to sell illegal drugs. He allegedly made two drug sales and
was arrested for possession with intent to distribute all on the
same day.

The information that he had additional drugs was

obtained from the confidential informant.

All of the offenses

involving the Defendant occurred on the same day, involved the same
officers and occurred in the same county.
According to Utah Code § 76-1-402(2) if conduct establishes
separate offenses under a single criminal episode, the offenses are
within the jurisdiction of a single court and the offenses are
known to the prosecuting attorney then the defendant may not be
subject to separate trials for multiple offenses.

It is clear that

at the time the initial information was filed that the state, its
officers and attorneys were aware of all of the charges that could
be brought against the Defendant.

In fact, the charges presently

being brought were allegedly committed earlier on the same day as
the previous charges which have been adjudicated.

The state could

not argue that the offenses are not within the jurisdiction of the
court or that the prosecuting attorney did not know of all the
offenses allegedly committed by the Defendant. A conscious choice
4

was made to bring some of the charges against the Defendant
following his arrest on November 7, 2001 and to later bring the
remaining charges against the Defendant,
All of the charges brought against the Defendant are closelyrelated in time and are incident to an attempt or an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.

Assuming the state's evidence to

be true, the Defendant was in Duchesne County, Utah in possession
of methamphetamine and cocaine which he intended to sell.

One sale

occurred in the morning of November 7, 2001. Another sale occurred
in the afternoon of November 7, 2 001.

The Defendant was arrested

shortly after the second sale and charges for possession were
brought against him. He plead guilty to four second degree felonies
involving possession
possession

and

distribution

and distribution

of methamphetamine

of cocaine.

and

Those charges were

initially brought in November, 2001. In April, 2002, charges were
brought against the Defendant alleging that he had distributed
cocaine and methamphetamine.
The court in State v. Crosby, 927 P 2d 638 (Utah 1996) stated
that if there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one
plan, even thought there is a serious of transactions, there is but
one offense.
In State v. Keppler, 976 P 2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) the
court indicated: "The specific nature of the property possessed
determines the offense in a possession offense. In this case, we
note that the property implicated in the two charges is not of the
5

same quality.

The Legislature expressly prohibits the possession

of drug paraphernalia and the possession of methamphetamine as
separate statutory offenses."
In the Keppler case, the Court allowed the plaintiff to
separately prosecute a charge of possession of paraphernalia from
possession of methamphetamine.
In this case, all charges brought against the Defendant are
charged under Utah Code § 58-37-8.
CONCLUSION
The charges pending against the Defendant at the present time
should be dismissed based on the law referred to above.

DATED this //)

day of September, 2002.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that on this
day of September,
2002, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum to:
Herbert Wm. Gillespie
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney
P.O. Box 2 06
Duchesne, Utah 84021
by depositing same in the United States Post Office, Roosevelt,
Utah.
Secretary
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COURT

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael W. SPAULDING, Defendant and
Appellant.

closely parallels this case, defendant pleaded guilty
to possessing paraphernalia and was then charged
with possessing methamphetamine. Id. at 99. This
court rejected defendant's double jeopardy claim
because the legislature made possession of drug
paraphernalia and possession of methamphetamine
separate offenses and therefore did not establish the
"same criminal objective prong." Id. at 100. For the
same reason, Spaulding's possession of drug
paraphernalia and the traffic offense cannot be
considered the "same criminal objective" as his
charge for possession of methamphetamine.

No. 981437-CA.
Nov. 4, 1999.
Justin Bond, Brigham City, for appellant.
Jan Graham and Scott Keith Wilson, Salt Lake
City, and John D. Sorge, Brigham City, for appellee.
Before GREENWOOD, DAVIS, and JACKSON,
JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM.
*1 Spaulding pleaded guilty to possession of
marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a
traffic offense. He asserts he was subjected to
double jeopardy in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-402(1) (1999) for being prosecuted separately
for possession of methamphetamine. We disagree.
"A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out
of a single criminal episode." Utah Code Ann. §
76-1- 402(1) (1999). A "single criminal episode" is
defined as "all conduct which is closely related in
time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Id.
at § 76-1-401 (1999). It is undisputed that the first
requirement, "related in time," was met. However,
we agree with the trial court that the offenses for
which Spaulding pleaded guilty and the one for
which he was prosecuted do not satisfy the second
prong, "accomplishment of a single criminal
objective." In State v. Keppler, 976 P.2d 99 (Utah
Ct.App.1999), involving a fact situation which
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

Similarly, Spaulding's possession of marijuana and
possession
of methamphetamine cannot be
considered part of the same "criminal objective."
Though the offenses are charged under the same
general statute, they involve different subsections
because they concern different drugs. Proof of
Spaulding's possession of marijuana would not
sustain
a
conviction
for
possession
of
methamphetamine and vice versa. Furthermore, in
Keppler, 976 P.2d at 100, this court cited
approvingly to cases from other jurisdictions
concluding the statutory prohibition against
multiple punishments for the same conduct does not
preclude separate conviction for simultaneous
possession of certain drugs. See People v. Manarrez,
78 Cal.Rptr.2d 247, 250 (Cal.Ct.App.1998)
(determining defendant was properly charged
separately
under
same
code
section
for
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine);
Cunningham v. State, 567 A.2d 126 (Md.Ct.1989)
(concluding defendant was correctly charged
separately
under
same
code section
for
simultaneously possessing heroin and cocaine);
State v. Delfino, 490 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1986)
(determining defendant was properly charged
separately
under
same
code
section
for
simultaneously possessing cocaine and marijuana).
Accordingly, Spaulding has not been subjected to
double jeopardy.
Affirmed.
1999 WL 33244799 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 324
END OF DOCUMENT

Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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8TH DISTRICT COURT STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
PLAINTIFF

DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

vs

APR ) 3 2X2

KYLE KENT STRINGHAM

JOANNE UcKEE, CLERK

CASE NO.

BY

D-O-B.

•

£L~

DEPUTY

4-11-59

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DUCHESNE )

I, Brad Draper do hereby make solemn oath and declare that,

I am a certified peace officer in the State of Utah.
That I am employed as an Agent with the Department of Correction, Adult Probation and
Parole and that I am an Agent of the Uintah Basin Narcotic Strike Force, charged with the
enforcement and investigation of criminal activity within the State of Utah.

1. That on 11-7-01 this Affiant began an investigation involving the Illegal Distribution of
a Controlled Substance. (Methamphetamine) On 11-7-01 at approximately 08:15 hours this
Affiant received a telephone call from CI # 01-222. The informant advised this Affiant that
he/she had been contacted by Carol Keser and that a shipment of Methamphetamine had
arrived at her house. Ms. Keser told CI # 01-222 to come to her house to make the drug
transaction.
2. At 09:27 hours this Affiant placed an audio transmitting device on the informant This
Affiant searched CI # 01-222 person. No drugs, money or contraband were located. At
09:42 hours this Affiant issued the informant $ 250.00 dollars to purchase narcotics.
At 09:43 hours a telephone call was made by the informant to the Carol Keser residence
in Neola, Utah. During this telephone call Carol Keser again confirmed to Ci # 01-222 that
the drugs had arrived at her house and to come and gets some..
3. At 09:47 hours this Affiant drove CI # 01-222 to Neola. Officer derek Nelson followed
us in a red and white Chevy truck that was equipped with the receiving device. We met on
the south side of the Neola LDS church parking lot at which time this Affiant exited the
vehicle the informant was driving. This Affiant searched the informants vehicle. No drugs,
money or contraband were located.
4. CI #01-222 drove a few blocks away to the Carol Keser residence. The informant made
with a female he/she called, "Carol".

Once inside the Carol Keser residence this Affiant

heard CI # 01-222 begin talking about a drug transaction with a male he/she called, Kyle.
At 10:10 hours this Affiant heard the informant count out money to Kyle who then handed
methamphetamine to the informant. This Affiant heard Kyle tell the informant he had more
methamphetamine and cocaine for sale.

This Affiant heard CI # 01-222 tell Kyle that

he/she wanted to buy an eight ball of cocaine and that he/she would pick it up later in the
afternoon. CI # 01-222 left the Keser residence at 10:17 hours and traveled southbound
on the Neola highway with this Affiant and Officer Nelson following behind. This Affiant
and Officer Nelson followed him/her to the North Cresent area where a debrief interview
was conducted.
5.This Affiant, Officer Nelson and CI # 01-222 arrived at a safe meeting place at 10:30
hours. This Affiant was handed two individual baggies of methamphetamine from the
informant at 10:30 hours. Also at this time (10:30 hours) this Affiant conducted another
search of CI # 01-222 person. No drugs, money or contraband were located. Officer
Nelson conducted a search of the vehicle CI # 01-222 was driving. He did not locate any
drugs, money or contraband.
6. During a debrief interview this Affiant was told by the informant that he/she traveled to
the Carol Keser residence in Neola. That he/she spoke with Carol Keser and Kyle
Stringham. That she gave Kyle Stringham $ 250.00 dollars in exchange for 1 3/4 grams
of methamphetamine.

That Kyle Stringham advised CI # 01-222 he had more

methamphetamine and cocaine for sale. CI #01-222 stated he/she ordered and eight ball
of cocaine and would pick it up later in the day.
7.

That the above described controlled substance purchased was examined by

experienced members of the task force and that it did appear to be methamphetamine.
The substance was packaged in small zip lock baggies which is common for
methamphetamine. That it had the color and texture that methamphetamine is commonly
known to have.

That it was told to the informant by Kyle Stringham that it was

methamphetamine.

8. This Affiant has probable cause to believe and does believe that Kyle Kent Stringham
has committed the offense of "Distribution of a Controlled Substance" in violation of Utah
code 58-37-8 and has been correctly identified by the informant.

THESE OFFENSE OCCURRED WITHIN DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

AFFIANT OFFICER

THIS AFFIDAVIT WAS SWORN TO BEFORE ME BY AFFIANT ON THIS
DAY OFfffo^ 200,

5ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

8TH DISTRICT COURT STATE OF UTAH
DUCHESNE COUNTY, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
PLAINTIFF

FiLED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, U i AH

vs

APR

KYLE KENT STRINGHAM
CASE NO.

D-O-B.

JOANNE McKsE CLERK
BY

04-11-59

STATE OF UTAH

\ 2 ::~

¥

Av ./L

DEPUTY

)

COUNTY OF DUCHESNE )

I DEREK NELSON DO HEREBY MAKE SOLEMN OATH AND DECLARE THAT.

I AM A CERTIFIED PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH, AND AM
EMPLOYED AS AN OFFICER WITH THE ROOSEVELT CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
AND AGENT OF THE UINTAH BASIN NARCOTICS STRIKE FORCE. CHARGED WITH
THE ENFORCEMENT AND INVESTIGATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE
STATE OF UTAH.

1. THAT ON 11-07-01 THIS AFFIANT BEGAN AN INVESTIGATION OF A

DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CASE. THAT ON 11-07-01 THIS
AFFIANT, A.P.&P. AGENT DRAPER, AND AP&P SECRETARY SHERRIE BROWKAW
MET WITH C.I. 01-222. THAT C.I. 01-222 INFORMED THIS AFFIANT THAT HE/SHE
HAD MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO PURCHASE AN "EIGHTBALL" OF COCAINE FROM
KYLE STRINGHAM. C.I. 01-222 SAID THE TRANSACTION WAS TO TAKE PLACE AT
THE CAROL KEISER RESIDENCE IN NEOLA.

2. THATON 11-7-01 AGENTDRAPER CONDUCTED A SEARCH OF C.I. 01-222'S
PERSON AND VEHICLE. THAT NO MONEY OR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE
LOCATED. THAT AGENT DRAPER DID GIVE C.I. 01-222 AN AUDIO TRANSMITTING
DEVICE, THAT WAS PLACED ON THE HIS/HER PERSON. THAT THIS AFFIANT DID
ISSUE C.I. 01-222 TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS FOR THE PURCHASE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.

3. THAT THIS AFFIANT

FOLLOWED C.I. 01-222 AND OBSERVED THAT

HE/SHE DID GO TO THE CAROL KIESER RESIDENCE IN NEOLA. THAT CI 012-222
WAS INSIDE THE RESIDENCE FOR APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES. THAT THIS
AFFIANT HEARD C.I. 01-222 PAY A MAN TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS,
AND THEN HE/SHE SAID THANK YOU. THAT THIS AFFIANT HEARD THE MALE MAKE
ARRANGEMENTS TO MAKE ANOTHER TRANSACTION IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH
C.I. 01-222 INVOLVING EIGHT "G'S" FOR FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS.

4. THAT THIS AFFIANT AND AGENT DRAPER FOLLOWED C.I. 01-222 FROM
THE CAROL KIESER RESIDENCE, AND MET AGAIN AT A SAFE LOCATION TO
DEBRIEF THE BUY.

5. THAT THIS AFFIANT RECEIVED A BAGGIE CONTAINING THE PURPORTED
COCAINE AND A CELLOPHANE WRAPPER THAT CONTAINED A SUBSTANCE ALSO
PURPORTED TO BE COCAINE FROM C.I. 01-222. THAT THIS AFFIANT RECEIVED
TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS FROM C.I. 01-222. THATTHISAFFIANT DID AGAIN SEARCH
THE VEHICLE, AND

PERSON OF C.I. 01-222,

AND THAT NO MONEY OR

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE FOUND. .

6. THAT THIS AFFIANT DID DEBRIEF THE BUY WITH C.I. 01-222. THAT C.I. 01222 TOLD THIS AFFIANT THAT HE/SHE GAVE KYLE STINGHAM TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY FIVE DOLLARS. C.I. 01-222 TOLD THIS AFFIANT THAT KYLE STRINGHAM
GAVE HIM/HER TWO BAGS OF COCAINE.

7. THAT THE ABOVE DESCRIBED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PURCHASED
WAS EXAMINED BY THIS AFFIANT AND OTHER EXPERIENCED TASK FORCE
MEMBERS AND THAT IT DID APPEAR TO BE AN ILLEGAL CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE AS PURPORTED BY KYLE STRINGHAM AND C.I. 01-222. THAT THE
SUSPECTED COCAINE WAS DELIVERED TO THE UTAH STATE CRIME LAB TO BE
TESTED. THAT THE SUBSTANCE TESTED POSITIVE FOR COCAINE.

8. THIS AFFIANT HAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE AND DOES BELIEVE
THAT KYLE KENT STRINGHAM HAS COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF DISTRIBUTION
OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE COCAINE IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 58-378. AND HAS BEEN CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED BY THE INFORMANT.

THESE OFFENSE OCCURRED WITHIN DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

AFFIANT OFFICER
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